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1. INTRODUCTION
For the past several decades India has been playing host to foreign banks (FBs) 
and some of them have been operating in this country for more than a century.  FBs in 
India operate through their  branch networks and representative offices.  The policy of 
Government  of  India  according  permission  to  a  FB  for  business  in  this  country  is 
governed by "reciprocity". This allows the entry of FBs only from those countries in 
which  Indian  banks  operate,  or  foreign  governments  have  allowed  new  policy  of 
reciprocity,  the  Government  of  India,  through  RBI,  follows  a  restrictive  policy  in 
extending  permission  to  existing  FBs  for  expanding  their  network  of  branches. 
Nevertheless,  once a  FB is  allowed to  operate  in  India,  it  is  not  discriminated in  its 
business dealings vis-à-vis domestic banks (DBs). FBs, in fact,  are free from bearing 
certain responsibilities, which the DBS have (see Sections 2.1 & 2.5)
Operating under the India policy environment, in recent years, FBs as a group 
compared  to  their  domestic  counterpart,  have  shown outstanding  results  in  terms  of 
various indicators of performance, particularly profitability (Keshari and Paul 1994 and 
Nag and Shivaswamy 1990). The significantly better performance of FBs vis-à-vis DBs 
has led to the general belief that the former is inherently more efficient than the latter. 
However, the recent study by Keshari and Paul (1994) has found that DBs are no less 
technically efficient than FBs. In view of this finding, this study offers and alternative 
explanation regarding greater profitability of FBs, according to which FBs attain greater 
level of profitability than DBs because the former operate only with a profit  motive; 
having a superior bundle of rent-yielding assets; cater to different market segments; and 
work under different regulatory compulsions.
The  major  objective  of  this  study  is,  therefore,  to  identify  those  factors  or 
characteristics of FBs (vis-à-vis DBs) operations in India, which provide them a greater 
level of profitability. For the purpose of this study all 75 scheduled commercial banks 
(excluding regional rural banks or RRBs) were divided into two groups, namely, FBs and 
DBs.  FBs comprise of all foreign banks (23) operating through their branch network in 
India.  DBs consist of both public sector banks (28) and private sector banks (24).  Data 
were collected from the several publications of the RBI and Indian Banks Association 
and then computed according to our requirement. (The data sources have been referred to 
at appropriate places).
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The remaining part of the study is organized as follows: (a) Sections –2 discusses 
the differing characteristics of FBs and DBSs operation in India (b) Section-3 examines 
the performance of FBs and DBs. (c) Section-4 offers conclusions.
2.  OPERATIONAL  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  FOREIGN  AND  DOMESTIC 
BANKS
The  theory  of  internalization  suggests  that  the  multinational  banks  enjoy 
internationalisation advantage in overcoming imperfection in the international financial 
market (Rugman 1981, Chapter 5).  Affiliates of multinational banks (FBs) in India and 
elsewhere  being  part  of  a  worldwide  network  have  access  to  certain  tangible  and 
intangible  resources  which  are  not  normally available,  or  only available  in  a  limited 
amount to DBs.  The tangible resources include, among other things, foreign funds and 
highly  skilled  manpower,  while  the  intangible  assets  comprise  of  diversification 
advantage, management and marketing skills, know-how for introducing new products, 
better customer services, internationally established marketing network, reputation and 
goodwill, specialized information on financial market, etc.
Armed with these resources,  the branches of FBs often concentrate  themselves in 
highly specialized and profitable areas of business.  These business include dealings in 
foreign exchange and money market; consultancy on portfolio management for corporate 
customers;  provision of 'new' financial  services (e.g.  credit  cards, commercial  papers, 
leasing-ire-purchase, certificates of deposits, etc.) financing for purchase of real estates; 
housing and consumer durables,  and so on. For these reasons,  FBs mostly operate in 
metropolitan  centers  and  target  at  exclusive  group  of  customers  including  the 
multinational corporations (MNCs), large Indian companies, non-resident Indians (NRIs), 
professionals, etc.
On  the  contrary,  due  to  different  set  of  priorities,  inadequate  international 
presence, and to some extent lack of expertise, DBs direct their attention to traditional 
banking business of money lending and deposit mobilization.  They also have to fulfill 
their  responsibilities  related  to  social  banking.  As  a  result,  the  customers  of  DBs 
constitute different sections of people and institutions than that of FBs. Owing to the 
above factors, we hypothesize that DBs and FBs constitute two distinct groups in the 
Indian banking industry.  In the following sub-sectiins, we test this hypothesis by offering 
empirical  evidence  on  some  aspects  of  differing  characteristics  of  DBs'  and  FBs' 
operations in India, which are greatly affected by the resource endowment, strategies and 
priorities of the respective groups and policies of the Government of India.
2.1 BRANCH NETWORK
Partly for performing the role of development banking, DBs in India have been 
burdened with the responsibility of opening branches in rural and semi-urban areas.  As a 
result, over the years, DBs particularly public sector banks, have multiplied their branch 
networks in these areas.  FBs, on the contrary, mostly operate in the major cities of the 
nation, having most of their branches in the four metropolitan cities.
Data published by IBA (1992)  shows that  out  of total  number  of branches of 
Indian scheduled commercial banks (excluding RRBs) as at end of March 1991, 40 per 
cent were located in rural areas; 22 per cent in semi-urban areas; 17 per cent in urban 
areas and 13 per cent in metropolitan areas2.  In the group of DBs, the share of rural 
branches was the highest – 48 per cent, while FBs were almost entirely concentrated in 
metropolitan and urban areas3. Notably metropolitan centers accounted for a very high 
proportion, 88 per cent, of the total branch network of FBs4.
2.2 SKIL INTENSITY
As mentioned, FBs are expected to be more skill intensive than their counterparts 
in the Indian Banking industry for a variety of reasons. Two alternative measures of skill 
intensity calculated for the study corroborated this view. The first measure, which is in 
terms  of  the  percentage  share  of  officers,  clerks  and  subordinate  staff  in  total 
employment, suggests that FBs compared to DBs have a larger proportion of officers, but 
much smaller  proportion of  clerks and subordinate  staff  among their  total  number  of 
employees.  As a proportion of total  employment  at  the end of  March 1991,  officers, 
clerks  and  subordinate-staff  constituted  25  per  cent,  53  per  cent  and  22  per  cent 
respectively  in  DBs,  whereas  it  was  32  per  cent  and  22  per  cent  and  18  per  cent 
respectively in FBs5. The second measure of skill intensity approximated by the average 
wage rate prevailing in 1990-91 shows that the average wage rate per year applicable to 
the employees of FBs and DBs were Rs.1.0 lakh and 0.54 lakh respectively6. Hence the 
skill intensity of FBs is more than double that of DBs.
2.3 DEPOSITS
Deposit mobilization is a very important activity of any bank of bank group.  The 
larger the amount of deposits a bank holds, the greater leverage it has in deploying these 
funds  profitably.   The share and growth rate  of total  deposits  held by different  bank 
groups have shown that FBs, as a group, in recent years has experienced the highest 
growth rate in the Indian banking industry. Consequently, the FBs share in the aggregate 
deposits of all bank groups has increased by 1.2 per cent in 1992 from the previous year's 
level7. Data on groupwise ownership pattern of banks' deposits supports the view that 
FBs make greater efforts to mobilize deposits from the corporate sector.  At the end of 
March  1991,  non-financial  corporate  sector  accounted  for  12.5  per  cent  of  the  total 
deposits of FBs, 8.0 per cent of the total deposits of State Bank group, 4.7 per cent of 
2IBA (1992), Computed from Table IV p.322.
3Ibid
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total  deposits  of  Nationalised  Bank  group  and  2.3  per  cent  of  the  total  deposits  of 
domestic private banks8.
In the latter half of the 1980, FBs with their innovative schemes, international 
linkages and aggressive marketing concentrated heavily on NRIs for attracting large sums 
of deposits  in foreign exchange.  As a result,  at  the end of March 1991 NRI deposits 
constituted a major proportion (55 per cent) of the total deposits of FBs, while it formed 
only about 7 per cent of the aggregate deposits of DBs9.  The main reasons for attracting 
NRI deposits by FBs were two: (i) it provided substantial benefit by way of exchange 
profit;  and (ii)  it  attracted less deposit,  in total  deposit  of  FBs, enabled them to earn 
greater exchange profit, as also to retain additional loanable funds that could be more 
profitability deployed elsewhere.
The duration-wise distribution of outstanding deposits of different bank groups at 
the end of March 1991 shows that FBs, as a percentage of their total deposits, had as high 
as 77 per cent locked in the highest interest-bearing term deposits; 15 per cent in non-
interest bearing current account; and 8 per cent in saving account, compared to these, 
DBs on an average had about 58 per cent in term deposits, 16 per cent in current account 
and 26 per cent in saving account10.
The reasons for having a much smaller proportion of deposits in savings account 
and the larger proportion in the fixed account by FBs could be the following: First, in 
recent years, term deposits of shorter maturities such as of 45 days or 90 days have been 
introduced,  offering almost the same return to a customer as the term deposits of the 
longer period.  The clientele of FBs being educated and more business-like might have 
shifted a proportion of the money deposited in saving accounts to the fixed accounts of 
short-term maturity,  while  DBs major  proportion  of  term deposits  remained with the 
longer maturity. The data on maturity pattern of term deposits show that a substantial 
proportion (52 per cent) of deposits held by FBs has a maturity period of upto one year, 
while only 17 per cent of the deposits of DBs fall in this category11.  Second, as a major 
proportion of total deposits of FBs comprises of NRI deposits, which is mostly in the 
nature  of  term deposits,  the  FBs'  share  of  term deposits  in  the  aggregate  deposits  is 
higher12.
2.4 ADVANCES
Advances of the banks in India are divided into three heads: (i) loans, cash credit, 
overdraft and loan payable on demand, (ii) bills discounted and purchased, and (iii) term 
loans. Although the advances under the first head is the highest, in recent years FBs have 
assiduously  nurtured  a  high  proportion  of  bill  business  in  their  advances  portfolio. 
Attractive returns of about 2.5 to 3 per cent, low cost of servicing, self-liquidating and 
8Ibid, calculated from data given in Statement 6, p.1237
9Ibid, calculated from data given in Statement 6, p.1239
10Ibid, calculated from data given in Statement 5, p.1236
11Keshari (1993), Table 7, p.14
12Keshari (1993)
short-term character of the bill market and availability of easy rediscounting facilities, 
have led to FBs' involvement in a big way into bill businesses (RBI 1992, RBI 1993c). At 
the end of March 1991, FBs extended almost 36 per cent of their total outstanding credit 
for  bill  financing,  while  DBs devoted  only 10  per  cent  for  the  same purpose13.  The 
Janakiraman Committee (1993), however, has noted serious irregularities in the conduct 
of the bills portfolio of a few large FBs.  For instance, the brokers were financed by 
banks through the discounting of bills, not supported by genuine transactions. At the end 
of March 1991, term loans  constituted 22 per cent  of total  credit  of  FBs,  whereas  it 
formed a much greater proportion of 34 per cent in DBs' outstanding total credit14.
An  analysis  of  data  on  occupation-wise  distribution  of  outstanding  credit  of 
scheduled commercial banks as at end of March 1991 shows that the industrial sector got 
the largest proportion of total credit from each bank group, but the proportion of credit 
extended by FBs to this sector was much higher than that by DBs. Notably, the industrial 
sector accounted for 63 per cent and 48 per cent of outstanding credits of FBs and DBs 
respectively15.   The  credit  portfolio  of  FBs  also  shows  that  both  the  agriculture  and 
transport operators' sector together received an insignificant proportion (0.5 per cent) of 
total credit16.  On the contrary, DBs loaned relatively a large proportion (18 per cent) of 
total credit to these sectors17.   Indeed the agriculture sector assumed the second most 
important  category in  the credit  portfolio  of DBs.  FBs'  concentration in  metropolitan 
centers coupled with their reluctance to serve agricultural sector are responsible for this 
phenomenon.  The  personal  loans  and  professional  services  were  the  second  most 
important category after the industrial sector in terms of credit received from FBs.
The other major features of the credit portfolio of FBs operating in India have 
been  the  predominance  of  the  private  corporate  sector  among  their  borrowers, 
concentration of credit flow at the medium level credit ranges, particularly in the range of 
Rs.50 lakhs to 4 crores (Nag and Shiwaswamy 1990). The concentration of credit flow of 
FBs in the medium level ranges can be explained by the specific size of the business and 
the unique form of ownership of the clientele of these banks.  Notably, the average size of 
business of the private sector firms including foreign controlled companies is small than 
that of the public sector firms. Therefore, the borrowings needs of the former are also less 
than that of the latter. Moreover, it is well known that MNC affiliates need to borrow less 
than their local counterparts in the domestic market.
2.5 PRIFORITY SECTOR ADVANCES
In conformity with the declared policy of the Government of India, the banking 
system has to align itself to the needs of a planned economy.  Consequently, banks are 
expected to play a prominent role in social and development banking in which earning of 
13Keshari (1993), Table 7, p.16.
14Ibid
15Compiled from data given in RBI (1993b).
16 Ibid
17 Ibid
profit  assumed  the  secondary  objective.   However,  the  role  of  social  banking  is 
adequately performed only by DBs.  For instance, a DB has to compulsorily devote 40 
per cent of its total advances to the priority sector which include agriculture, small scale 
industries, retail trade, professional and self employed people, education, state sponsored 
organization for scheduled casts and scheduled tribes, etc.
In contrast to DBs, till recently FBs in India have been free from the obligation of 
priority sector lending. It was only since 1988 that the RBI made it compulsory for FBs 
to earmark a proportion of their total lending to the priority sector. A directive from RBI 
has fixed targets that the individual FBs should seek to achieve in their lending a share to 
the priority sector –10  per cent by 1988-89, 12 per cent by 1989-90 and 15 per cent by 
1991-92 (Sarkar 1990).  Although these targets for FBs have been far less than those 
stipulated for DBs, FBs could not achieve even these targets. The latest data show that the 
priority sector advances to total advances of FBs on an average stood at 8.9 per cent in 
March 1990, but it slipped to 8.9 per cent in March 1991 and further to 7.2 per cent in 
1992 (RBI 1993c).
The  average  interest  rate  charged  on  priority  sector  advances  is  considerably 
lower than that on commercial landings.  Interest rates applicable to the priority sector 
advances  are  highly  regulated  by the  RBI,  and  ranges  from 10  per  cent  for  certain 
categories of agriculture loans, to a maximum of 16 per cent for certain categories of 
small scale industrial loans (Keshari 1993, p. 14). Compared to these rates, the minimum 
interest rate on lending by commercial banks is 15 per cent per annum.  Due to lower 
return on priority sector lending, banks (both DBs and FBs) are normally reluctant to 
extend credit to this sector.
The latest data on priority sector lending of DBs suggest the following: (a) the 
share of priority sector advances in the net work credit of public sector banks declined 
from 40.9 per cent at the end of June 1991 to 39.3 per cent at the end of June 1992; and 
(b) the share of private sector banks' advances to priority sector constituted 34.7 per cent 
of their net bank credit at the end of September 1991 (RBI 1993d, Chapter VII, pp 158-
59).  Thus, DBs too, especially the private sector domestic banks could not achieve the 
priority sector lending target of 40 per cent as stipulated by the RBI.  Nevertheless, the 
major burden of total priority sector lending still rests on DBs, particularly public sector 
banks.  In the total outstanding priority sector advances at the end of March 1991, private 
sector DBs and public sector banks shared 3.6 and 94.9 per cent respectively, whereas FB 
accounted for only 1.4 per cent (Keshari 1993, p.22).
2.6 INVESTMENT
The recent annual  survey on 'Investment  of the Indian Scheduled Commercial 
Bank's  conducted  by  the  RBI  shows  that  the  outstanding  investment  of  FBs  have 
witnesses tremendous growth of 87 per cent between 1991 and 199 while the investments 
of all  scheduled commercial  banks have grown only by 24 per cent during the same 
period ((RBI 1993e). Alongwith the steep rise in the investments of FBs, the share banks 
and investment to deposit ratio of FBs, has gone up considerably while credit to deposit 
ratio of the same has sharply declined, clearly indicating a shift in recent years in the 
deployment of additional resources by FBs from advances to investment purposes (RBI 
1993c).
The pattern of investment of different bank groups at the end March 1992 reveals 
that: i) All Scheduled Commercial Banks including FBs predominantly invested in Indian 
Government  securities (64 per cent) followed by other trustee securities (29 per cent and 
shares and debentures of the joint stock companies securities, ii) FBs compared to all 
Scheduled Commercial Banks, have allocated a much larger proportion (18 per cent) of 
their investment in shares and debentures of joint stock companies, and thus invested a 
smaller proportion (16 per cent) in other trustee securities18.
Characteristics of maturity of investment in Indian government securities shows 
that: a) new investments were predominant directed in the year range of 2007-2011. In 
this maturity range, SBI and associated, Nationalised banks, other scheduled commercial 
banks and foreign banks respectively directed 98 per cent, 95 per cent, 7 per cent  and 94 
per cent of their total new investments by 1992; b) As far as old investments (loans) were 
concerned, FBs preferred to invest in securities with shorter maturity period. About 64 
per cent of old securities held by FBs in 1992 were due to mature before 1995, while the 
shares of holding of such securities by SBI and Associates was only 12 per cent and that 
of Nationalised banks was 5.3 per cent19.
Since the Government securities with longer maturity period carry higher rates of 
interest, interest range wise distribution of investments of scheduled commercial banks 
suggests  that  the  proportion  of  total  investment  falling  into  the  category  of  highest 
interest range is greater in the case of DBs than that in the case of FDs20.
2.7 IRREGULARITIES IN SECURITY TRANSACTIONS: THE ROLE
     OF DBs AND FBs
The  Janakiraman  Committee  (1993)  on  “Securities  Operations  of  Banks  and 
Financial Institutions" had found serious irregularities in the fund management by and 
functioning of Commercial banks and financial institutions. These irregularities include 
“absence of necessary internal control in various functions, raising of money without the 
backing of genuine securities, diversions of call money to the current accounts of chosen 
brokers and massive collusion between the officials concerned and the brokers involved 
in dealings in government securities, public sector bonds, units etc.” (RBI 1992a, pp.30-
31).  Investigation  of  the  Committee  has  particularly  revealed  the  following  serious 
aspects of irregularities (RBI 1993f  and 1993g):
First of all, for instance – several banks, Standard Chartered, Citi Bank, Grindlays 
Bank, Canara Bank, State bank of Patiala, etc have been carrying on their  securities 
transactions  in  total   violation  of  the  RBI  guidelines  on  Portfolio  Management 
Services (PMS).  Some of the major contraventions of RBI guidelines regarding PMS 
of banks have been as follows: (a) a definite fee was not charged for the management 
services  rendered  to  their  clients;  (b)  a  few  PMS  accounts  were  closed  before 
completion of the prescribed one year lock-in period ; (c) the deals between banks' 
18RBI (1993e), compiled from Statement 2, pp. 942-43.
19RBI (1993e), compiled from Statement 6, pp. 949-51.
20Refer to Statement 7, RBI (1993e), pp.952-53.
own investments and PMS clients were not conducted at market rates; and (d) a fixed 
rate of return to the PMS clients was promised and paid. 
Secondly,  some banks violated  the  norms  of  banking  by involving  themselves  in 
ready-forward transactions with non-bank counter parties and in transactions other 
than in SLR securities – both having serious implications for entire banking industry. 
A large volume of these transactions was conducted by FBs and has been with or 
through  brokers.   In  many cases,  even  the  underlying  securities  related  to  these 
transactions did not exist.  Some banks made short sales of securities and thus raised 
money on a clean basis. This was done by issuing bankers receipts (BRs) having no 
backing of securities.
Thirdly, the extent of involvement of FBs in ready forward deals and PMS related 
trading of securities has been much greater than those of DBs.  For example, the share 
of five most  active FBs,  namely,  Citibank, Standard Chartered,  Bank of America, 
ANZ Grindlays and American Express worked out to be 56 per cent of total 'ready 
forward' transaction in securities during 1 April 1991 to 23 May 192.  Moreover, in 
the total PMS related transactions, the participation of a single but most active foreign 
bank, Citibank, was computed at 69 per cent.
2.8 INCOME
The total income of the bank is broadly divided into: (a) interest income and (b) 
'other' income, interest income includes income earned; (i) on advances and discount of 
bills, (ii) through investment in securities and (iii) on balances with RBI and interbank 
funds, "Other" income comprises of income earned by ways of commission, exchange, 
brokerage, profit/loss on sale of securities, exchange transactions and other business.
Interest income forms a major proportion of total income of each group.  DBs as 
well as FBs, the former group had 91 percent, while the latter had 82 per cent of the total 
income in the category of interest income in 199121.  Within the interest income category, 
income earned through investment in securities and through discounting of bills by FBs 
showed an upward trend in recent years, due to increase in investment-deposit ratio, as 
also due to expansion in bill business of FBs (RBI 1993c).
Due  to  a  larger  proportion  of  banks'  fund  blocked  in  fulfilling  the  RBI's 
requirements of statuary liquidity ratio, cash reserve ratio and priority sector lending, and 
also due to a highly administered interest rate structure, spread on fund-based business 
has been on the decline. In this situation, while most of the DBs could not divert from 
traditional fund-based business.  FBs began to participate actively in fee-related and off-
balance sheet businesses, the attractive opportunities for which were created since the 
mid-1980s.
The non-fund-based business contributed greatly to the 'other income category of 
total income of FBs.  This is also reflected in the sharp rise in the share of other income 
(in total income) of FBs from 17.5 per cent in 1990-91 to 23.0 per cent in 1991-92.22  In 
21 Computed from data given in IBA (1993a), IBA (1993b) and IBA (1993c).
22Ibid
contrast, the share of 'other' income of DBs remained almost constant at about 9 per cent 
for both the years23.   The 'other income’ category of FBs was particularly boosted in 
recent  ears  by  their  heavy  involvement  in  securities  related  transactions  and 
unprecedented growth in income earned by way of exchange transactions.  However, the 
virtual disappearance of security related transactions due to exposure of the securities 
scam, led to a dip in the share of 'other' income to 7.7 per cent of total income of FBs, and 
the consequent loss in the FBs business in 1992-93 (Majumdar 1994).
2.9 EXPENDITURE
The latest published data on total expenses of a bank have been classified into 
three heads: (a) interest expenditure; (b) wages and salaries, and (c) other expenditures. 
The composition of total  expenditure for each bank group in 1990-91 shows that the 
interest expenditure constituted a major proportion about 64 to 65 per cent of average 
total expenditure of a bank group, irrespective of its ownership domestic or foreign24. 
Interestingly, the share of wages and salaries in total expenditure for the group of FBs 
was 7.3 per cent, while it was 18 per cent for the group of DBs25.
On the other  hand,  share  of  'other'  expenses  incurred as  a  proportion  of  total 
expenses was 27.8 per cent in the case of FBs, as against 18.2 per cent in the case of 
DBs26.  This might have happened because the two major elements of other expenditure, 
namely  expenditure  on  tented  premises,  insurance  and  taxes,  and  on  stationery  and 
printing comprised of a much higher proportion of total expenditure of FBs than that of 
DBs.  Since FBs mostly operate through rented premises, and rent being extremely high 
in the business centers of metropolitan cities, they have to spend a substantial sum of 
money on rent. In addition to very high payment on rent, several factors, for instance 
greater publicity provision of better  services to customers, and extra attention paid to 
non-fund based business, all these germane in the very characteristics of FBs' operation, 
perhaps lead to additional expenditure by FBs on the part of stationery and printing.
2.10  PROFITABILITY PERFORMANCE OF DBs AND FBs
Various indicators of profitability, such as profit as a proportion of total income, or 
working fund and of own fund given in Table, shows that the average profitability of FBs 
is greater than that of DBs. The question is what accounts for the higher profitability of 
FBs vis-à-vis DBs. Based on our analysis  in Section 2,  we suggested that the higher 
profitability attained by FBs are the result of (i) different sets of priorities and distinctive 
business strategies followed by FBs, and (ii) preferential treatment given to FBs by the 
Government.
23Ibid
24Ibid
25Ibid
26Ibid
TABLE: 
INDICATORS OF RETURN, EXPENDITURE AND PROFITABILITY BY BANK 
GROUPS, 1990-91
Sl.No
.
Indicators Public Sector 
Banks
Private Sector 
Banks
Foreign Banks
1. Total expenses as % of total 
Deposits
13.2 12.0 17.5
2. Total expenses as % of total 
advances
20.4 22.5 25.8
3. Total expenses as a % 
Working Fund
10.3 10.4 12.4
4. Interest income as % of 
Working Fund
9.5 9.9 11.7
5. Other income as % of 
Working Fund
0.9 0.9 2.5
6. Spread as % of Working 
Fund
2.9 4.0 3.6
7. Profit as % of Own Fund 7.5 18.0 44.0
8. Profit as % of Working Fund 0.2 0.3 1.5
9. Profit as % of income 1.5 3.2 10.3
Sources:  i)  IBA (1993a),  Public  Sector Banks:  Performance Highlights,  1991-92 (Bombay:  Indian Banks 
Association); ii) IBA (1993b), Private Sector Banks, Performance Highlights 1991-1992, (Bombay: Indian 
Banks  Association);  iii)  IBA (1993c),  Foreign  Banks Performance  Highlights,  1991-92 (Bombay:  Indian 
Banks Association).
A greater  involvement  of FBs in  'highly profitable'  activities like bill-discounting, 
portfolio  management  services,  investment  in  securities  (viz.  ready and double  ready 
forward transactions), foreign exchange dealings, new financial services, financing, NRI 
business, etc., led to a sharp increase in income, particularly 'other' income, of this group. 
On  the  other  hand,  considerably  greater  contribution  of  DBs  towards  priority  sector 
lending  and  less  involvement  of  DBs  in  ‘highly  profitable’  activities  implies  less 
realization of income for DBs than that of FBs.
Table also shows that, compared to DBs, FBs realize much greater return on their 
operation.  Notably,  both  interest  and  non-interest  income  as  a  proportion  of  total 
deployment of working fund was much higher in the case of FBs.  Additionally, FBs 
operations were found to be costlier than DBs.  Yet, spread as a proportion of working 
fund was larger in the case of FBs than in the case of public sector banks.  These results 
obviously imply greater level of profitability for FBs operation in India.
4. CONCLUSION
This  paper  has  tried  to  examine  the  relative  characteristics  and  profitability 
performance of FBs and DBs.  A comparison of their characteristics undoubtedly suggest 
that FBs as a group differed significantly from DBs.  It was also found that the higher 
profitability of FBs was a reflection of their  particular  operational characteristics  and 
strategies, as also the favourable attitude of the Government towards them.
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